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assistance.1.  INTF-JCTION
Nutritional  interventions  exist  in  many  developing  countries.
They  are  of  course  to  be  found  as  emergency  relief  programs  after
disasters  or  famines,  but  regular  supplementary  feeding  programs  are
also  widespread.  A  key  question  for  these  programs  is  targeting.
Since  resources  are  limited,  some  method  has  to  be  adopted  of  making
sure  that  nutritional  supplements  are  given  to  those  who  need  it  most.
The  most  effective  method  is  to  evaluate  the  nutrient  shortfall  from  a
given  standard  for  each  individual  and  to  supply  exactly  this  amount
of  supplement  and  no  more.  But  such  fine  targeting  is  not  possible  on
the  ground,  and  practitioners  rely  on  more  easily  observable
indicators.  Examples  of  such  methods  are  levels  and  trends  in
anthropometric  indicators  such  as  weight-for-height,  weight-for-age,
and  upper  arm  circumference.  However,  if  the  intervention  is  fccussed
specifically  on  prevention  rather  than  cure,  age  is  acknowledged  to  be
one  of  the  better  ways  of  identifying  at-ri:k  population  groups
(Kennedy  and  Alderman  1986).'
Accepting  that  age  may  fulfill  the  role  of  a  useful  targeting
indicator,  this  still  leaves  open  the  exact  nature  of  its  use. In
many  cases  programs  use  an  upper  ae  Jimnit  for  eligibility
(Pfeffermann  and  Griffin  1989,  Beaton  and  Ghassemi  1982,  Timmons  et.
1  How  easy  is  it  to  assess  an  individual's  age  in  cultures  not
dominated  by  calendars?  Enumerators  concerned  with  accurate  age
measurements  under  these  circumstances  are  trained  to  construct  a
detailed  calendar  of  local  events  based  on,  for  example,  climatic  auid
crop  cycle  highlights  (UN  1986).-2-
al.  1983).2  What  should  this  upper  age  lint  be,  if  the  objective  is
to  minimize  undernutrition  with  given  resources  for  the  provision  of
nutritional  supplements?
It  will  be  recognized  that  the  above  question  is  part  of  the
general  class  of  indicator  targeting  problems,  as  developed  by  Akerlof
(1978).  We  refer  to  it  as  the  problem  of  unoer-liMit  indicatgr
irgiUtng.
The  first  objective  of  this  paper  is  thus  to  develop  a  framework
for  upper-limit  indicator  targeting,  and  to  illustrate  it  for  the  case
of  age-based  nutritional  interventions  using  individual  level,  intra-
household  survey  data  from  the  Philippines.  Although  the  data  used
provide  only  an  approximation  to  individual  nutritional  achievements
within  the  household,  most  surveys  in  developing  countries  do  not
provide  even  this  information.  How  far  wrong  can  one  go  with  only
household  level  data  on  nutrition?  The  second  objective  of  this  paper
is  therefore  to  provide  a  quantitative  estimate  of  the  value  of  the
extra  information  that  the  costlier  intra-household  survey  provides,
when  the  objective  is  to  design  optimally  targeted  nutritional
interventions.  There  is,  however,  a  recognition  in  the  nutrition
literature  that  such  interventions  cannot  be  seen  independently  of  the
nature  of  the  intrahousehold  nutritional  allocaticn,  since  a
supplement  to  a  child  can  be  nullified  by  an  equivalent  reduction  in
2  Infants  in  the  age  range  6-36  months  are  especially  highly
targeted  as  (1)  they  are  vulnerable  to  undernutrition  (low  energy
density  weaning  foods  for  example),  and  infection  (the  move  from
breast  feeding  to  weaning  foods,  and  increased  toddler  mobility  for
example)  and  (2)  the  functional  consequences  of  poor  health  are  more
severe  for  this  age  group..3-
feeding  at  home  (Alderman  1990).  The  third  objective  of  the  paper  is
therefore  to  provide  a  quantitative  assessment  of  how  far  wrong  one
goes  by  neglecting  the  intrahousehold  repercussions  of  a  nutritional
intervention.  We  start,  howevpr,  with  some  basic  theory  on  indicator
targeting.
2.  UPPER-LINIT  INDICATOR  TARGETING:  THEORY
Let  0  denote  a  measure  of  nutritional  adequacy  (for  example,  the
calorie  adequacy  ratio  for  an  individual)  and  t  the  age  of  an
individual.  Let  f(0,t)  be  the  Joint  density  of  the  two  variables  in
the  population.  If  z  measures  a  normatively  given  "adequate  level
for  0,  (e.g.  z  - 1  for  calorie  adequacy),  then  a  measure  of  the  extent
of  undernutrition  in  the  population  is  given  by
P.  = f  AA'f(t  )dot  (1)
00  z
It  will  be  recognized  that  this  measure  of  undernutrition  is
analogous  to  the  measure  of  poverty  put  forward  by  Foster,  Greer,  and
Thorbecke  (1984).  Variants  of  it  have  been  discussed  in  the  context
of  undernutrition  by  Kakwani  (1989)  and  Ravallion  (1990).  This  will
be  the  workhorse  of  our  analysis  of  nutritional  targeting-the  object
of  policy  will  be  to  reduce  the  value  of  Pa  as  given  by  (l).  The
magnitude  of  a  reflects  value  judgements  on  the  view  taken  about  the
depth  of  undernutrition.  When  e  - 0  this  depth  is  ignored  and  the  PO-4-
essentially  miasures  the  fraction  of  population  that  is
underno"rished.  When  a  - 1,  P 1 is  the  aggregate  nutrition  gap,
suitably  normalized.  As  a  increases  above  1,  P.  gives  greater  and
greater  weight  to  those  with  lowest  nutritional  achievement.  Most  of
our  empirical  analysis  will  concentrate  on  the  values  a - 09  1  and  2
as  capturing  this  range  of  value  judgements.
Before  introducing  policy,  notice  that  P.  can  be  rewritten  using
the  fact  that
f(,,t)  = a(*It)  h(t)  (2)
where  a(0  I t)  is  the  conditional  density  of  0  given  t  and  h(t)  is  the
marginal  density  of  t  in  the  population.  Using  (2),  (')  becomes




f  Ps (t)  h(t)  dt
0
In  other  words,  total  undernutrition  is  simply  the  sum  of
undernutrition  at  each  age  level,  weighted  by  the  proportioit  of
population  at  that  age  level.
We  sappose  that  the  policy  maker  has  a  total  amount  of
nutritional  supplement  B  to  dispense.  If  each  individual  0  could  be-5-
observed  costlessly  the  policy  program  would  be  easy-simply  find
those  for  whom  0 is  less  than  z  and  administer  the  right  amount  of
y  supplement.  But  on  the  ground  this  is  impos.'Nle  to  do  and  other
criteria  are  used.  One  such  criterion  is  an  tpper  age  limit  T  such
that  only  those  with  age  less  than  or  equal  to  T receive  the
supplement.  If  there  exists  a  household  survey  that  allows  us  to
estimate  the  bivariate  density  f(o,t),  this  could  be  used  to  choose
the  optimal  value  of  T,  such  that  Pe  is  minimized  for  the  given  amount
of  rasources  B. But  how?
We  have  to  specify  how  the  supplement  is  distributed  to  those  who
meet  the  criterion.  The  simplest  model,  and  also  the  most  practicable
method,  is  to  distribute  the  supplement  equally  among  those  'let
through  the  door"  on  the  criterion  that  their  age  be  less  than  or
equal to  T.  There are H(T)  individuals  of  age  less  than  or  equal  to  T
where  H(-)  is  the  cumulative  distribution  of  the  density  h(.).  Thus
each  individual  who  satisfies  the  criterion  gets  an  amount  B/H(T)  and
the  new  level  of  undernutrition  is  given  by
T  z-B/H(t)
P,  (B,T)  *  f  [Z  -,  a(*  !  t)]  h(t)dt
(4)
as  z
f  |  f  Zt  a (4  1 t)  Ih (t)  dt-6-
The  central  question  is  what  happens  to  Pe  (B,T)  when  T changes
for  given  B. Differentiating  (4)  with  respect  to  T  we  get:
d. 6 (BT)  a  ,  Bh(T)  f  P-  B(,T  I t)h(t)dt
d-r  Z  [H(T)  ]2  (5
+  [ Pe(B,T  I t)  - P,  (O,T  I T)  ]h(t)
The  two  terms  on  the  right  hand  side  of  (5)  capture  the  conflicting
effects  on  undernutrition  when  the  upper  age  limit  is  increased  at  the
margin,  so  that  more  people  are  drawn  into  the  net.  These  new  people
get  a  supplement  so  their  nutrition  improves-this  is  the  second  term
on  the  right  hand  side  of  (5).  But  with  the  new  people  there  is  less
to  go  around,  anJ  those  already  in  the  net  lose  out.  This intra-
marginal'  effect  is  captured  by  the  first  term  on  the  right  hand  side
of  (5).  As  shown  in  Kanbur  (1987),  the  impact  of  a  small  decrease  in
transfer  on  Pi  is  proportional  to  P,. 1 and  this  term  consists
precisely  of  expressions  of  this  type.
Further  insight  into  (5)  can  be  derived  by  specializing  to  the
case  of  a  - 1. Then  (5)  becomes
T dPj 1 (B,  T) _  2.  Bh  (T) T~  BrIthtd  6
dT  z  (H(T) 2  o  (6)
+  [P1 (B,T  I T)  - P1 (O,T  I T)lh(T)
Further  manipulation  on  P,  (B,T  I T)  and  P,  (O,T  I T)  leads  to-7-
dPj  (B,T)  1  .B * h(T)  lp  (B,T  I t  sT)  - Po (B,T  I T)|
dT  zH  (T)0
z  (7)
h  fT  a  z3  t  !)  do
z_B/H (T)  )
From  (7),  the  impact  of  a  change  in  T  on  undernutrition  as  measured  by
P,  de  .)nds  on  two  factors.  First,  there  is  the  extent  to  which  the
incidence  of  undernutrition  for  those  with  age  less  than  or  equal  to  T
exceeds  or  falls  below  the  incidence  of  undernutritien  for  those  at
age  T. Second,  there  is  the  extent  of  original  undernutrition  of
those  of  age  T  who  stop  being  undernourished  with  the  intervention.
While  the  second  term  is  somewhat  convoluted,  the  first  term  is
intuitive--it  is  the  difference  between  the  marginal  and  the  infra-
marginal  incidence  of  undernutrition  for  given  T.
The  optimal  value  of  the  age  cut-off  occurs  when  (5)  is  zero.
Denote  this  by  T*. But  it  can  be  seen  that  this  leads  to  a  complex
equation  for  T  that  cannot  be  solved  in  closed  form.  A  numerical
analysis  is  required,  and  we  now  turn  to  that  in  the  context  of  a
specific  data  set.
3.  OPTIMAL  AGE  CUT  OFFS  FOR  NUTRITIONAL  TARGETING:  AN  APPLICATION
TO  PHILIPPINE  DATA
The  data  set  used  here  comes  from  a  household  survey  in  the
Philippines.  The  data  and  methods  of  collection  are  descriued  fully
in  Bouls  and  Haddad  (1990).  The  data  contain  information  on  nutrition
among  448  households  in  the  southern  Philippine  province  of  Bukidnon,.80
collected  and  averaged  over  four  rounds  to  account  for  seasonality  and
other  fluctuations.  The  distinctive  feature  of  the  data  Is  that  the
food  intake  of  each  individual  in  the  household  was  obtained.  The  24-
hour  recall  method  was  used  (for  an  evaluation  of  this  method,  see
Bouis  and  Haddad,  1990).  This  intake  can  be  converted  into  calories
using  standard  conversion  factors.  !n  addition,  we  can  calculate  the
calorie  requirement  for  each  individual  baWed  on  32  age-gender-
pregnancy  status  categories.  For  this  reason,  the  data  are  to  he
viewed  as  illustrative  rather  than  definitive  measures  nf individual-
level  nutrient  adequacy. 3 The  calorie  adequacy  ratio,  the  ratio  of
intake  to  requirement,  is  our  measure  of  undernutrition  in  this
application,  and  we  use  a  calorie  adequacy  ratio  of  one  as  our
benchmark  (i.e.  z  - 1,  in  terms  of  the  formulae  in  the  previous
section).  We  will  refer  to  this  as  a  "poverty  line",  although  it  is
clear  that  in  our  application  it  is  an  'adequate  nutrition  line".
The  food  energy  deficit  in  our  sample,  namely  the  sum  of  the
individual  difference  between  intake  and  requirement,  is  1,048,631
calories  for  the  2880  individuals  in  the  448  households.4  As  in  the
previous  section,  let  0  be  an  individual's  calorie  adequacy  ratio.  If
we  did  not  have  individual  level  data,  we  would  be  forced  to  assign  a
households  calorie  adequacy  ratio  to  each  individual  in  that
household.  Donate  this  variable  by  4 . Figure  1  shows  that  the  mean
3  For  a  finer  analysis,  individual  energy  requirements  would  in
addition  be  based  on  body  weight  and  activity  patterns.
'4  All  programmes  for  Tables  1,  2,  4  and  Figures  1-7  were  written
in  Microsoft  Fortran  version  3.1.-9-
of  0 in  an  age  group  Increases,  by  and  large,  with  age,  but  that  the
mear  of  4  ,  does  not.  This  insensitivity  of  *  to  age  is  also  brought
out  by  figure  2.  Here  poverty  indices  as  given  by  equation  (1'  are
calculated  for  each  age  grouping  based  on  0  and  Pl.  P'ain,  age  is  a
sensitive  predictor  of  P,(O)  but  not  Pi(  4  ). This  insensitivity  of  4
and  its  transforms  drives  many  of  our  results  in  the  following
section.  The  sensitivity  of  X to  age  may  suggest  a  prima  facie  case
for  an  upper  age  limit  to  calorie  supplements  through  feeding  programs
and  the  like.  But  what  is  the  optimal  age  cut  off?
Figure  3  shows  the  behavior  of  P^ (B,  T)  as  a  functiz*.  of  T  for
various  values  of  B  with  a  set  at  1. The  top  line  is  for  B  *  0,  which
obviously  shows  no  effect  on  P.  of  changes  in  T. The  lowest  line  is
when  8  - 1  million  calories,  Just  abou.  the  amount  necessary  to
eliminAte  the  energy  deficit  if  it  could  be  targeted  only  to  those
with  deficits.  But  when  this  is  not  possible,  the  curve  shows  the
best  that  can  be  achieved  with  age-bas!d  targeting.  As  the  upper  age
limit  of  eligibility  increases,  from  low  values  of  T,  undernutrition
falls.  Thus  the  marginal  effect  of  bringing  more  people  into  the  net
dominates  the  infra-marginal  effect  of  spreading  resources  more  thinly
over  the  existing  beneficiaries.  However,  as  figure  3  shows,
eventually  this  balance  is  reversed,  and  there  is  an  optimal  T. We
call  this  our  scenario  1.
How  does  the  optimal  T,  T, depend  on  a  and  B,  the  parameters  of
the  problem?  Table  I  presents  values  of  the  optimal  upper  age
eligibility  for  various  values  of  a  and  B and  figure  4  plots  this
surface.  It  is  seen  that,  by  and  large,  T*  increases  in  a  and  in  B.-10-
The  fact  that  T increases  in  B  is  intuitive  - when  there  are  more
resources,  mors  people  can  be  optimally  brought  into  the  net. The
fact  that  T*  increases  in  a  is  related  to  a  greater  depth  of
undernutrition  at  the  mdargin  rather  than  infra-marginally.  At  lower
age  eligibilities  there  are  so  few  who  qualify  for  supplement  that
those  within  the  net  are  pushed  far  above  the  poverty  line,  therefore
there  is  no  inframarginal  undernutrition,  and  as  a  increases,
undernutrition  at  the  margin  is  weighed  more  heavily,  and  the  optimal
T is  reached  at  higher  ages.
4.  THE  VALUE  OF  INTRA-HOUSEHOLD  INFORMATION
The  analysis  of  the  previous  section  is  based  on  a  survey  that
collects  information  on  individual  nutrition  within  the  household.
Bt;t  most  surveys  available  to  planners  in  developing  countries  collect
food  consumption  information  only  at  the  household  level.  The  usual
method  of  proceeding  is  ths;i  to  calculate  a  measure  of  household
calorie  ade  uacy,  and  to  attribute  this  to  each  individual  in  the
household.  Intra-household  inequality  is  therefore  ignored.
Intra-household  information  on  nutrition  is  costly  to  collect  and
it  would  be  useful  to  know  the  benefits  from  its  collection.  In
particular,  how  useful  is  it  in  targeting?  With  our  data  set,  we  can
provide  an  answer  to  this  question.  As  before,  let  O  be  the  true
individual  calorie  adequacy  ratio  and  denote  by  $ the  individual
calorie  consumption  adequacy  ratio  when  each  individual  is  simply
allocated  the  household's  calorie  adequacy  ratio.  Without  information
on  individual  intakes,  we  would  be  forced  to  use  the  bivariate-11-
distribution  of  $ and  t,  to  calculate  the  optimal  upper  age
eligibility.  We  call  this  our  scenario  2. Denote  the  optimal  value
of  T as t  . Thus  all  those  with  age  less  than  V  will  get  nutrition
supplement  B/H(  '  ).  Undernutrition  with  this  supplement  is  given
by  expression  (4)  with  T  -
Figure  5  compares  the  behavior  of  Po(B,T)  and  P.s(B,T)  as  a
function  of  T  for  2  values  of  B  at  a  - l. It  is  clear  that  TI  and  V
can  be  very  different.  In  general,  the  Ps*  curves  are  flatter  and
lower  than  the  P, curves.  Intuitively,  the  flatness  is  a  reflection
of  the  flatness  of  the  $ and  Pm#  lines  evaluated  within  each  age  group
(see  figures  1  and  2). The  suppression  of  intrahousehold  inequality
as  represented  by  $ results  in  age  being  a  much  poorer  correlate  with
observed  undernutrition  and  hence  a  poorer  targeting  instrument.  The
marginal  undernutrition  reduction  effect  dominates  the  inframarginal
effect  until  much  higher  levels  of  T are  reached.  In  addition,  the
lowness  of  the  Pg4  curve  reflects  the  shallowness of  observed  poverty,
at  all  age  groups,  once  intrahousehold  inequality  is  suppressed.
The  difference  between  P. (B,T)  and  P* (B,  )  is  the
difference  in  undernutrition  when  the  wrong  infonmation  is  used.  A
measure  of  this  difference  in  calorie  terms  can  be  derived  as  follows.
If  B. is  the  solution  of  the  following  equation:
P64#(B,T)  (B,l-12-
the  difference  between  B.  and  B  represents  the  extra  calories  (or
equivalent  gain5)that  would  be  needed  to  achieve  the  same  level  of
undernutrition  reduction  with  the  'wrong'  age  cutoff,  t!  ,  as  was
achieved  with  the correct  age  cutoff,  T'. Table  2  presents  equivalent
gains  for  various  values  of  B  and  a. The  costs  to  not  having  accurate
individual  level  calorie  adequacy  information  upon  which  to  identify
r,  when  expressed  as  percentages  of  the  original  interventions,  can
exceed  30%. The  calorie  costs  are  substantial  precisely  because
actual  calorie  adequacy  is  strongly  associated  with  age,  and
suppression  of  intrahousehold  calorie  information  deprives  us  of  a
useful  targeting  instrument.
5.  INTRA-HOUSEHOLD  ALLOCATION.  LEAKAGE  AND  THE  INPLICATIONS  FOR
TARGETING
The  analysis  so  far  has  assumed  zero  sharing  of  the  calorie
intervention  that  the  eligible  individual  brings  into  the  household.
Either  because  the  intervention  is  divided  within  the  household,  or
through  reductions  in  non-intervention  calorie  intake  of  the  eligible
member,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  intervention  calories  add,  one-for
one,  to  the  total  calories  consumed  by  the  eligible  individual.  What
are  the  implications  for  the  age-based  targeting  of  calorie  leakage
from  the  eligible  individual  to  his  or  her  fellow  household  members?
Does  it  still  make  sense?  In  general,  this  depends  on  the  extent  to
which  there  is  intrahousehold  calorie  allocation  away  from  the
5  For  a  related  use  of  the  equivalent  gain  concept,  see
Ravallion  (1989).-13-
targeted  group  (TG),  i.e.  children.  These  tradeoffs  are  represented
in  Table  3.
Case  numbers  4  and  3  represent  scenarios  1  and  2  respectively,
and  case  8  represents  the  third  scenario,  food  sharing.  If  within-
household  food  sharing  is  substantial  but  intrahousehold  food
allocations  are  skewed  away  from  those  with  the  lowest  calorie
adequacies,  age-based  targeting  is  not  feasible.  Calories  directed  to
the  younger  housahold  members  end  up  in  the  hands  of  the  older
individuals.
Specifically,  our  data  set  allows  us  to  provide  an  answer  to  the
question  'how  useful  is  it  to  know  the  calorie  reallocation  outcome  if
age  is  used  as  a  targeting  instrument?'.  As  before,  let  O  be  the  true
calorie  adequacy  ratio,  and  let  each  eligible  individual  receive
B/H(T)  calories.  Now,  however,  the  individual  shares  the  calories
with  the  other  household  members.  The  arbitrary  rule  imposed  here  is
that  the  ith  individual's  pre-intervention  share  of  household
calories,  w,,  is  unaffected  by  the  intervention.6  Thu the  ith
individual  in  the  household  receives  (B/H(T)).w,  calories.  The  upper
age  eligibility  at  which  undernutrition  in  the  entire  sample  is
minimized  is  denoted  by  T;.  Figure  6  shows  the  behavior  of  P#oc(B,T)
as  a  function  of  T  for  various  values  of  B  with  a  set  at  1. As  with
previous  figures,  the  marginal/inframarginal  relationship  exists
although  it  is  not  as  smooth.  In  the  previous  scenarios  individuals
6  This  rule  can  be  justified,  however,  by  reference  to  certain
principles  of  bargaining  theory;  see  Selten  (1978).  For  an  analysis
of  intra-household  bargaining  over  nutritional  and  other  resources,
see  Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990b).-14-
could  only  receive  less  calories  as  the  net  widened.  In  this
scenario,  however,  individuals  already  in  the  intervention  can  receive
Mu  calories  as  the  eligibility  age  is  increased  (if,  for  example,
their  households  contain  two  children  quite  close  in  age).  Thus
P,O,(B,T),  the  undernutrition  index,  can  go  up  and  then  down.
Figure  7  compares  the  behavior  of  Po+(B,T),  Pa,(B,T)  and
P#(B,T)  as  a  function  of  T  at  B-i  and  a-I. It  is  clear  that  T  ,  can
be  very  different  from  T and  t  . When  the  three  functions  are
compared  on  the  same  vertical  scale,  we  can  see  that  P0C  (B,T)  is  the
flattest  and  lowest  of  the  th,ee  lines.
The  fLnt_M is  because  the  original  sampling  design  required
each  rural  household  in  the  Philippines  survey  contain  at  least  one
preschooler.  Each  household  immediately  receives  calories  even  when
the  upper  age  eligibility  is  only  2. Therefore  age  is  only  a  good
targeting  instrument  if  poor  households  contain  more  young  children
and  intrahousehold  allocations  are  not  skewed  away  from  them.  The
same  analysis  with  a  more  demographically  representative  sample
containing  older,  richer  households  with  no  children  would  produce  a
more  curved  PO(B,T).
The  1qLpilin of  the  line  results  from  (1)  the  objective
function  we  have  chosen  to  minimize:  undernutrition  across  all
individuals  in  the  sample,  and  (2)  the  large  absolute  calorie
interventions  that  are  reaching  adults  who  are  close  to  the  poverty
line  compared  to  smaller  calorie  interventions  reaching  children  who
are  far  below  the  poverty  line.  If  we  had  placed  larger  weights  in-15-
the  objective  function  on  the  alleviation  of  infant  undernutrition,
the  curve  would  be  higher.
The  difference  between  P#O(B,Tc) and  P.4k(B,T')  is  the  cost  in
foregone  undernutrition-reduction  when  no  food  sharing  is  assumed  in
the  calculation  of  upper  age  eligibility,  even  though  food  sharing
does  indeed  take  place.  Again,  if  B.  is  the  solution  of  the  following
equation:
Poc(B,T*)  - aoc(Bej
the  difference  between  B.  and  B  is  a  measure  of  the  cost  of  making  the
wrong  assumption  on  food  sharing.  Table  4  presents  equivalent  gains
for  various  values  of  B and  a. As  can  be  seen,  this  cost  is  virtually
zero  since  age  is  no  longer  closely  associated  with  the  delivery  of
calories  to  those who need them most.
6.  CONCLUSION
The  object  of  this  paper  has  been,  first  to  develop  a  framework
for  upper-limit  indicator  targeting,  and  to  illustrate  it  for  age
based  targeting  of  nutrition  interventions  using  data  from  the
Philippines.  Second,  we  have  provided  quantitative  estimates  of  the
value  of  individual  level  information  and  of  knowledge  of  the  intra-
household  allocation  of  calories.  For  our  sample,  age  proved  to  be  a
good  indicator  of  undernutrition.  However,  this  proved  not  to  be  the
case  with  household  level  calorie  adequacy  which  rendered  age
a0argnt]x  less  useful  as  a  targeting  instrument,  at  an  often-16-
considerable  calorie  cost.  Food  sharing,  on  the  other  hand,  trulv
rendered  age  impotent  as  a  targeting  instrument  because  of  within-
household  leakage.  This  effect  was  strengthened  because  each
household  contained  at  least  one  preschooler.  Therefore,  getting  the
age  'wrong'  here  had  few  consequences  in  terms  of  calorie  foregone.
We  conclude  that  the  design  of  nutrition  interventions  can  be
very  susceptible  to  the  level  of  aggregation  of  available  information.
This  is  consistent  with  our  findings  in  Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990a),
that  while  poverty  or  undernutrition  rankings  of  groups  defined  on
household  level  characteristics  were  not  sensitive  to  the  level  of
aggregation,  the  rankings  of  groups  defined  on  individual
characteristics  were  very  sensitive.  Possibly  the  costs  of  collection
of  these  intra-household  data  outweigh  the  benefits,  but  the
experiments  in  this  paper  begin  to  answer  questions  about  the  costs  of
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Table 1--Optimal age cutoffs  (T)  for  various values of
a  and calorie  intervention
Intervention
(millions  of  calories)
a  values  0.1  0.5  1
0  2.30  6.00  11.60
1  5.00  13.30  17.50
2  5.40  14.30  21.20-25-
Table  2--The  equivalent  cost  (in  calories)  of  not  having  individual-level  data
with  which  to  target
--  --  ,  --  --  --  - --  - - --  --  --  --  --  --  --  - --  --  --  - . - ,  --  --  -
a  calorie  T  (X)  T  (  4 )  P (T  (T))  P (T( 4 ))  difference  equivalent
intervention  (yrs) (yrs) V(1)  (2)  (2)-(1)  gain  (cals)
0  100000  2.3  3.5  0.66736  0.67500  0.00764  20200
0  200000  3.7  5.1  0.63090  0.64028  0.00938  18300
0  300000  4.8  6.2  0.59688  0.60972  0.01284  23500
0  400000  5.8  8.3  0.56285  0.58576  0.02291  55500
0  500000  6.0  9.1  0.53125  0.54757  0.01632  39800
0  600000  7.0  10.5  0.50104  0.51910  0.01806  51100
0  700000  8.8  11.4  0.46840  0.49236  0.02396  60700
0  800000  - 9.4  13.4  0.43368  0.46944 0.03576  96900
0  900000  10.5  15.7  0.40799  0.44549  0.03750  100000
0  1000000  11.6  18.7  0.38194  0.42014  0.03820  109800
1  100000  5.0  9.1  0.16722  0.16865  0.00143  2500
1  200000  7.3  11.5  0.15112  0.15270  0.00158  3700
1  300000  8.5  14.2  0.13661  0.13809  0.00148  3200
1  400000  11.8  18.8  0.12289  0.12589  0.00300  14600
1  500000  13.3  55.0  0.11008  0.12735  0.01727  153500
1  600000  14.2  65.4  0.09803  0.11679  0.01876  176900
1  700000  14.2  65.4  0.08729  0.10655  0.01926  192800
1  800000  17.5  65.4  0.07745  0.09683  0.01938  205700
1  900000  17.5  65.4  0.06835  0.08764  0.01929  217500
1  1000000  17.5  65.4  0.06047  0.07893  0.01846  221700
2  100000  5.4  11.9  0.05681  0.05748  0.00067  0
2  200000  11.4  18.3  0.04882  0.05013  0.00131  4000
2  300000  11.9  54.9  0.04173  0.04878  0.00705  113400
2  400000  14.2  54.9  0.03560  0.04341  0.00781  140700
2  500000  14.3  65.4  0.03044  0.03860  0.00816  163800
2  600000  17.5  65.4  0.02617  0.03410  0.00793  175000
2  700000  17.5  65.4  0.02230  0.03000  0.00770  187800
2  800000  19.8  65.4  0.01904  0.02627  0.00723  194500
2  900000  21.2  65.4  0.01622  0.02291  0.00669  198300
2  1000000  21.2  65.4  0.01387  0.01988  0.00601  195600
Note:  the  tolerance  for  (2)-(l)  is  0.001,  with  increments  of  1000  calories.-26-
Table  3-Targstins idividals:  Dsribiltity  ad  feaibility
DOsirable  Feasble
to"e  (1)  (2)  (3  (4)  t5)  (6)
Are  _uia9Inee  Doe TO a  is themr  is there  Any  masured  Does  It  tke  snse to target lnterventfmw  Scerlo of failuro to  lowr  utrient  su*stnftil  signif  leant  Intre-  at an ndividlO scenarlo  level? ant  sutrisnt  adeACy?  houhold food  Intrahouseld  houshold admcy  afW  ss*stitutimn  ftrient  IneqaslIty? eer  for  TO  activity?  inqality  ay
I  Ye  yu  no  no  no  desirable, feasible
2  ye  yes  no  no  we  desiroble.  fesfble,  wreng  ag
3  yes  yes  no  ye  no  desirable,  feasible,  e  2
4  Yu  Yes  no  yeu  yae  desirable,  feasible  I
S  Ys  Ye  Ys  no  n  dfirable,  feaible
6  VWa  we  we  no  Ye  desirable,  Mntlx  lnfesiblet
7  s  we  VWe  wes  no  desirable,  inruntz  fnfmaible.  wru  age
a  we  we  ws  dsirabte.  not Infeasble  3
Notes:
I  ot  would  agree  that the, wer  to qetion  (1) is  ywe'.  Na  micro  data  sets  find lowr calorie adeqacies  for prechoolers  sugtin  that the  ser  to (2) Is also swe'.  The  tatter result coutd  be true or false.  Faiseness  could  cme from  mesurnt  errors on the Intake  side (hae prescholers  been  fully  weaed? do they exhibit  sacking  behavior?)  or  the reqflrnts  sfde.  On the other hwd, the results could be a true reflectiln  of  a lak  of a reference rorm for  a health presooler.
2.  O(M)  Is dilficult  to aer,  but a stron posibility  exists for sherirg  of a presd  oler's  food  increment,  or a reictlon  In replar  food  to preschooler  If  the increment  Is  dlltd-epecif  Ic.
3.  0(4):  Research  with this date  set sugsts  that inerality  exists, slthough  asomnt pblm  men  that althoug the  nser to (S) Is "ye'.  the answer  to (4) could  be 'no'.
4  0(6):  The  uwr  to this qustion depnds  an a ohole host  of logistic and ost varables that w he  cenw iently abstrated  from,  but  &lSeIS  mfLm. how does  the anser to this qLmstion  depnd  on the  swes to qtlens  1-5?.27-
Table 4--The equivalent  cost  (in  calories)  of  assuming  no leakage when  computing
optimal  upper age eligibilities
...  ...  O.  *..............................  O.  ...........  @.  . . ..........................  .......... .... 
a  calorie  T*e(O)  T (0)  P *O(T.  (0))  P(T*(0))  difference  equivalent
interv  (yrs)  (yrs)  (if  (2)  (2)-(l)  gain  (cals)
…--  - - - - - - - - - - . - - . - - - - - -.
0  100000  5.3  2.3  0.67535  0.68160  0.00625  1000
0  200000  11.0  3.7  0.65382  0.65903  0.00521  1000
0  300000  13.1  4.8  0.63194  0.63889  0.00695  1000
0  400000  3.8  5.8  0.61042  0.61979  0.00937  1000
0  500000  4.5  6.0  0.58611  0.59167  0.00556  1000
0  600000  4.8  7.0  0.56424  0.57257  0.00833  1000
0  700000  4.4  8.8  0.54410  0.55035  0.G0625  1000
0  800000  7.3  9.4  0.52431  0.52674  0.00243  1000
0  900000  8.0  10.5  0.50382  0.50868  0.00486  1000
0  1000000  9.0  11.6  0.48403  0.48993  0.00590  1000
1  100000  12.1  5.0  0.17562  0.17630  0.00068  0
1  200000  13.9  7.3  0.15535  0.16607  0.00072  0
1  300000  13.9  8.5  0.15550  0.15652  0.00102  1000
1  400000  13.9  11.8  0.14608  0.14662  0.00054  0
1  500000  18.4  13.3  0.13702  0.13734  0.00032  0
1  600000  18.4  14.2  0.12835  0.12860  0.00025  0
1  700000  20.4  14.2  0.12010  0.12045  0.00035  0
1  800000  20.4  17.5  0.11221  0.11252  0.00031  0
1  900000  20.4  17.5  0.10470  0.10504  0.00034  0
1  1000000  20.4  17.5  0.09758  0.09793  0.00035  0
2  100000  13.9  5.4  0.06236  0.06296  0.00060  0
2  200000  18.4  11.4  0.05750  0.05762  0.00012  0
2  300000  18.4  11.9  0.05297  0.05305  0.00008  0
2  400000  18.4  14.2  0.04876  0.04886  0.00010  0
2  500000  18.4  14.3  0.04485  0.04499  0.00014  0
2  600000  18.4  17.5  0.04123  0.04131  0.00008  0
2  700000  18.4  17.5  0.03787  0.03796  0.00009  0
2  800000  18.4  19.8  0.03477  0.03487  0.00010  0
2  900000  18.4  21.2  0.03190  0.03200  0.00010  0
2  1000000  18.4  21.2  0.02927  0.02935  0.00008  0
Note: the tolerance  for  (2)-(l)  is  0.001, with  increments of  1000  calories.-28-
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